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ABSTRACT 
  
This paper develops and investigates a model of boundary decisions of inter-organisational 
relationship governance mechanisms in the mobile communication industry. The measurement 
variables of the framework were obtained from Williamson’s transaction cost analysis and modelled 
through canonical correlation analysis, which is estimated with empirical survey data from the 
mobile network operators and content providers in the telecommunication industry in Ghana. 
Consistent with the logic of transaction cost analysis framework, the study found support for 
significance relationship of behavioural uncertainty and frequency of transaction to have positive 
influence on the choice of authority-base governance mechanisms. However, empirical findings of 
environmental uncertainty and technological uncertainty that negatively influence the choice of 
authority base governance mechanisms do not corroborate with the transaction cost framework. We 
found significant and positive relation of environmental and technological uncertainties with 
contract-base governance mechanisms. Surprisingly, empirical findings never found support for asset 
specificity, which Williamson described as the ‘locomotive’ dimension of transaction cost analysis 
framework. Asset specificity was positively related to authority-base governance but was proofed not 
to be relevant in this relationship because it was insignificant. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Mobile network operators cannot expect to 
appropriately serve their wide range of customers 
alone if they are to provide the kind of services that 
customers will increasingly demand. They will be 
forced to enter into business relationships with a 
range of organizations. This therefore, requires that 
the network operators embrace the inter- 
 
 
 
 
 
organizational relationship governance concept and 
its implications. The way a relationship is governed 
affects the functioning of the organisations involved. 
Appropriate decision making is an important part of 
the inter-organisational relationship governance. 
However, the predominant question that is evidenced 
in literature is how to organise economic activities 
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(de Reuver and Bouwman (2012)). Several 
governance mechanisms have been suggested to 
organise economic activities. (Williamson, 1985) 
identified hierarchical, hybrid and contract, while 
Powell and DiMaggio (2012) ,Dyer Jeffrey H. (1998) 
identified trust, reputation, and  referral and goodwill 
as governance mechanisms. Some scholars in other 
disciplines have supported these mechanisms.  
However, available literature largely applies these 
mechanisms in the governance of large platform 
leaders such as Google and Apple platforms 
(Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013) or governance of 
value network de Reuver and Bouwman (2012). 
Scholars seldom pay attention on the governance of 
the MNOs platform in extant literature. Thus, insight 
into the governance of the MNOs platform is lacking. 
In the past, MNOs were at the centre of almost 
communication activities. They had control over all 
communication activities in relation to innovation in 
mobile communication. They kept control of the 
communication network and as well as access to the 
customers. The MNOs only allowed other players on 
their platform if they satisfy or met certain standards 
set by the MNOs. 
In recent time, the MNOs have less authority due to 
the increasing demands of their customers, they have 
realised that, they have to be flexible and collaborate 
with others if only they want to serve their customers 
well. Therefore, the focus of this paper is deliberately 
narrowed, for our overarching objective is to 
concisely gauge how the mobile network operators 
govern their relationship with content providers. 
Thus, identifying what governance mechanisms are 
used, and what determines the choice of these 
governance mechanisms. This paper contributes to 
the growing body of knowledge in the field of 
marketing by deepening the application and the 
understanding of inter firm relationship governance 
concept through the methodological approach of 
canonical correlation analysis. We therefore begin by 
briefly summarising the overview of the relationship 
between the mobile network operators and the 
content providers as found in literature. In the next 
section we present a theoretical background of 
organising and governing economic relationship 
activities and the related hypotheses. The third 
section describes our materials and the procedures 
we used to collect data. The fourth section finally 
analyses the data collected, presents the results and 
discuss findings and conclusion.  
2.0 Overview of the relationship between the 
mobile network operator and the Content 
Providers.  
 
It is said that in the future, hand held mobile devices 
connected to telecommunications network are 
predicted to become a critical way to gain access to 
the increasing amounts of content now in digital 
format as well as avail of services and applications. 
What is becoming clear is that mobile operators are 
unlikely to develop and manage all these services. 
Content and services are likely to be provided by a 
myriad of third party organisations ranging from the 
large media conglomerates to smaller organisations 
Peppard and Rylander (2006). Therefore, the mobile 
network operators will have to go into business 
relationship with content providers. 
Mobile network operators are companies that possess 
a mobile communication network and provide mobile 
communications and information services to 
customers wireless (Zhang and Liang (2011). A 
mobile network operator (MNOs), as (Bormann, 
Flake, & Tacken, 2007) said are telephone 
companies that “operate the access network 
infrastructure, delivers basic services to the user (e.g., 
Voice, SMS, Internet Access)”, provide mobile 
devices, and control the billing systems for the 
customers’ usage. For the mobile network function, 
the MNO “plans the network architecture and 
topology, acquires (buys or leases) and develops (in 
terms of civil engineering) the sites needed for 
rolling out the network, oversees the network 
implementation by suppliers and subcontractors, and 
operates and maintains the network”  
(Frisanco, Tafertshofer, Lurin, & Ang, 2008).They 
own the network (platform) and the end users which 
are their assets and capabilities. The platform (mobile 
network) is central and serves as a critical resource in 
the business network. In view of this, the platform 
owners (MNOs) offer a stable and predictable set of 
assets that other organizations can use to build their 
own offerings (Iansiti and Levien (2004)). The value 
that the industry provides, including the value from 
terminals, network and system equipment, and all 
kinds of services including basic services and  VAS 
( value –added services) are  integrated into the 
network and transferred to the end customers ( Zhang 
and Liang (2011).These end-users play a critical role 
around the MNOs business relationships. They are 
the final determinants of the success or otherwise of 
the MNOs business relationships. In order to build 
their networks, the MNOs enter into business 
relationship with the content providers. 
The content providers are third parties that go into a 
business relationship with the MNOs to enrich the 
network services by developing an array of content 
applications and services hosted and sometimes 
managed by the MNOs for customers to access. This 
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value proposition often integrates a multi-channel 
distribution offering that helps to broaden the reach 
and exploit the complementary characteristics of 
different channels.  The core activities of the content 
providers usually falls in the category of content 
collection, content processing and formatting, 
content publishing, content distribution, distribution 
agreements management. In some cases some of the 
contents may range from downloadable ringtones, 
games and news bulletins to live streaming television, 
cinema tickets, and music purchases. These services 
are commonly sold to the network operator by a host 
of content developers and preferred publishers. 
Where outright sales fails, sometimes agreement 
could be reached in respect of sharing of the revenue 
generated from the use of such services. For instance 
as one content provider noted ‘we find the standard 
85%:15% revenue sharing or split for i-mode much 
more reasonable than the 60% we get from Vodafone 
live’ (Peppard and Rylander (2006)). In the 
relationship between the MNOs and the content 
providers there is power difference in the relationship  
that allows the MNOs to act opportunistically by 
exercising its influence on the agreement resulting in 
an imbalance   split of the revenue generated. 
In a relationship between the MNOs and the content 
providers, there is an exchange relationship between 
the actors in which both parties depend on each other 
in the telecommunication industry. However, the 
relevant issues are the dimensions of exchanges that 
are brought on board by both parties and the extent to 
which these exchange dimensions influence the 
choice of governance mechanisms in governing the 
relationship. 
 
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
FORMULATION 
 
3.1: The Transaction Theory and the 
Governance Structures  
 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) theory can be 
viewed as a first endeavour in analysing economic 
exchanges, or transactions, rather than the goods or 
services, deviant from the neoclassical perspective of 
the firm. The transaction cost economics principle 
has been introduced by Coase (1937) but has become 
widely known by Williamson (1979)  by defining the 
cost of transactions in making or buying a product. 
Transaction Cost Economics maintains that there are 
‘rational economic reasons’ for choosing the means 
of governing transactions Williamson (1985)). This 
is captured in what Williamson (1991) called the 
‘discriminating alignment hypothesis,’ which holds 
that transactions, which differ in their attributes, are 
aligned with governance structures-i.e., market, 
hybrid, or hierarchy in a discriminating (i.e., 
transaction-cost-economizing) way. In other words, 
the governance mode (hierarchy, hybrid, or market) 
that minimizes transaction costs is the preferred 
option. The principal attributes of transactions, 
according to TCE, are asset specificity, uncertainty, 
and frequency. 
The primary assumption of TCA is that if adaptation, 
performance evaluation, and safeguarding costs are 
absent or low, rational economic actors will favour 
market governance. If these costs are however high 
enough to exceed the production cost advantages of 
the market, firms will favour internal organization. 
The sense making behind this position is relied on 
certain a priori assumptions about the properties of 
internal organization and its ability to minimize 
transaction costs. Three specific aspects of 
organizations are relevant in this respect.  First, 
organizations have more powerful control and 
monitoring mechanisms available than do markets 
because of their ability to measure and reward 
behaviour as well as output(Anderson & Oliver, 1987; 
Eisenhardt, 1985) . As a result, the firm's ability to 
detect opportunism and facilitate adaptation is 
enhanced. Second, organizations are able to provide 
rewards that are long term in nature, such as 
promotion opportunities. The effect of such rewards 
is to reduce the payoff from opportunistic behaviour. 
Third, Williamson (1999) acknowledges the possible 
effects of the organizational atmosphere, in which 
organizational culture and socialization processes 
may create convergent goals between parties and 
reduce opportunism ex ante. For instance as 
transactions become more specific and uncertain, 
transactors become more concerned about the threat 
of opportunism. First, as asset specificity increases, 
the threat of opportunism increases as a result of the 
difference between an asset’s first- and second-best 
use ( Mahoney and Pandian (1992)). Using markets 
or hybrids therefore exposes firms to greater 
exchange hazards. Second, when environmental 
uncertainty increases, contracts are more incomplete. 
This can cause adaptation problems because as 
environmental uncertainty increases, the number of 
unforeseen contingencies that can arise also increases. 
However, because these contingencies are unforeseen, 
transactors cannot specify them in contracts, which 
increases the threat of opportunism when adaptations 
are needed(Williamson, 1985).  
Third, when performance is difficult to measure, 
transactors can either lower output or quality that 
other transactors cannot easily detect. To protect the 
firm against such threats, firms can either craft and 
negotiate extensive market or hybrid contracts, which 
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is costly, or use hierarchical governance (Barthelemy 
& Quélin, 2002; Barthélemy & Quélin, 2006). Also, 
when non-specific assets support transactions or 
when there is little uncertainty, firms are less 
concerned about the threat of opportunism or the 
difficulty of adaptation in markets or hybrids. Firms 
are less concerned because they can easily redeploy 
assets or identify alternative transactors without high 
search costs( Williamson (1985)). Moreover, markets 
and hybrid modes of governance preserve stronger 
incentives. Thus, when transactions are supported by 
nonspecific assets or lack uncertainty, TCT 
postulates that market and hybrid modes economize 
on transaction costs, and thus, improve performance 
(Williamson (1985)). He predicts a positive 
relationship between these transaction attributes and 
more integrated governance structure. 
In summary, support has been found for the key 
explanation of boundary choice: that increasing asset 
specificity leads to diminishing effectiveness of 
market governance because markets lack effective 
mechanisms for resolving coordination problems and 
opportunism in specialized exchanges Poppo and 
Zenger (2002). It has also be found that, performance 
measurement difficulties are high when outputs 
cannot be easily monitored and evaluated. The threat 
of opportunism is increased on the grounds that 
transactors can intentionally bring down output or 
lessen quality in ways that might not be detected by 
others. Furthermore, an increased frequency of 
transaction will reduce the information asymmetry 
between the organizations making hierarchical 
mechanisms more appropriate(Van de Vrande, 
Lemmens, & Vanhaverbeke, 2006; Van de Vrande, 
Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 2009). Base on the 
support from literature, we hypothesise that:  
 H1: In a relationship between the mobile 
network operator and content provider, high 
asset specificity positively influence the 
decision to adopt authority-base governance 
mechanism, 
 H2: In a relationship between the mobile 
network and content provider, high 
environmental uncertainty positively 
influence the decision to adopt authority-
base governance mechanism, 
 H3: In a relationship between the mobile 
network and content provider, high 
behavioral uncertainty positively influence 
the decision to adopt authority-base 
governance mechanism, 
 H4:In a relationship between the mobile 
network and content provider, high 
technological uncertainty negatively 
influence the decision to adopt authority-
base governance mechanism, 
 H5: In a relationship between the mobile 
network and content provider, high 
frequency of transaction positively influence 
the decision to adopt authority-base 
governance mechanism, 
4.0MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Data Source 
 
The study principally borders on organizational-level 
decisions; therefore, a key respondent or informant 
survey through questionnaire was used to collect data 
for the study between February and June, 2017.In 
this approach, the researchers used one or more 
respondents in each organization who are deemed to 
have knowledge and take part in transaction 
partnership decisions and as well report on behalf of 
the organization. These respondents are not randomly 
selected from each organization. Rather, they are 
purposefully selected to be key respondents or 
informants by virtue of their position within the firm. 
The respondents in this survey were the managers 
and staff at executive positions. Transaction 
governance decisions are typically managerial 
decisions that reside largely within the managerial 
units of a firm. Individuals in these positions are 
likely to be abreast with and knowledgeable about 
the issues of relationship governance. With this 
consideration in mind, it was felt that the appropriate 
key respondents would be the managers or staff at 
executive position responsible for transaction 
partnership relationship. The key respondents were 
drawn from different categories, namely: mobile 
network operators being the principal firms that do 
businesses with the service value –added firms 
(content providers). Efforts were made to ensure that 
the right respondents were engaged. Finding 
respondents for this type of survey was a difficult 
task, since no database exists for all relevant partners 
engaged in transaction partnership in the 
telecommunication industry from any national 
database. However, we managed to get a list of 
service value-added firms in the telecommunication 
industry from the database of the mobile network 
operators. These lists aggregated and constitute the 
total population of service value-added firms. 
Transaction actors that transacted with more than one 
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mobile network operator were recognised as one 
actor in the population. This was to avoid duplication 
of transaction partners. 
 Research assistants were engaged to help in the data 
collection. They were adequately trained for that 
purpose. To explain the questionnaire and its context, 
the participants were offered a detailed background 
of the study either through an introductory letter or 
meeting. Relevant areas or topics that needed to be 
responded were covered. The broad topics included, 
transaction governance, modes of transaction 
exchanges in transaction partnerships and how these 
transaction exchanges influence their choice of 
governance modes. Participants were given adequate 
time to prepare themselves as well as to express 
interest in taking part of the exercise. Follow ups 
were made to identify participants who were willing 
to take part in the exercise. In the administration of 
the survey questionnaires, the research assistants 
ensured that participants submitted questionnaires 
that were completely answered and did not allow 
room for incomplete questionnaires. Email was also 
provided for those who expressed to take soft copies 
of the questionnaires for response or for onward 
submission to appropriate officers to respond. A total 
of 178 of completed questionnaires with valid 
responses for the survey were received. The 
completed questionnaires were thoroughly checked 
for response bias. In the analysis of data, canonical 
correlation analysis model was used. 
 
5.0 DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis and Reliability 
 
Exploratory Factor analysis was conducted to 
examine the factor structure of each variable.  In 
accordance with Hair, Ringle, and Sarstedt (2011), it 
was decided that in order to reduce the number of 
items and to facilitate interpretation, principal 
component analysis with the orthogonal rotation 
(varimax rotation) was used. This was performed for 
the measures of both the governance mechanism and 
transaction dimensions (authority governance 
mechanism, contract governance mechanism, and 
trust governance mechanism, asset specificity, 
environmental uncertainty, technological uncertainty, 
behavioural uncertainty, and frequency). Secondly, 
the reliability of the scale was equally measured with 
Cronbach alpha criterion to find out if all the 
indicators of the scale will measure the same 
construct. Each measure had satisfactory internal 
consistency with a Cronbach‘s alpha value above .70. 
The KMO and Bartlett’s test for sample adequacy 
was also performed to assess the communalities of 
the indicators. Cross loadings of factor indicators 
were adequately checked to find out the extent of 
correlations among the factor indicators, that is 
convergent and discriminate validity were checked to 
find out the internal consistency of the factor 
indicators’. The factors demonstrate sufficient 
convergent validity, as their loadings were all above 
the recommended minimum threshold of 0.350 for a 
samples size of 300Hair et al. (2011). The factors 
also demonstrate sufficient discriminant validity, as 
the correlation matrix shows no correlations above 
0.70 and there are no problematic cross-loadings. The 
number of factors indicators for each construct was 
determined, based on the eigen-value greater than 1 
criterion. Items were retained if they loaded above 
0.50 on the factor.  
Finally we modelled a canonical correlation analysis 
to determine the relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables (governance mechanisms 
and transaction dimensions). CCA is most 
appropriate when a researcher desires to examine the 
relationship between two variable sets. For CCA to 
make theoretical sense as a multivariate analysis 
there should be some rationale for why the variables 
are being treated together in variable sets. For 
example, a researcher may have four different 
measures of transaction attributes in the predictor 
variable set and three different measures of 
governance mechanisms in the criterion variable set. 
The research question of interest, then, would be 
whether there is a relationship between transaction 
attributes and governance mechanisms as multi 
operationalized in the variable sets. In contrast, if the 
researcher only had one criterion measure of 
governance mechanism, then multiple regressions 
would be conducted. If only one variable set were 
available, then the researcher may choose to conduct 
some sort of factor analysis to synthesize the 
variables. If more than one variable exists in both sets, 
then CCA may be the analysis needed. The model 
also has the ability to minimize the threat of 
committing Type 1 error.  It allows for simultaneous 
comparisons among the sets of variables rather than 
requiring many statistical tests be 
conducted(Thompson, 1993). Another reason is that, 
this technique can be used instead of other parametric 
tests in many instances, making it not only an 
appropriate technique to use but a comprehensive 
technique as well. As has been demonstrated by 
(Henson, 2001)and (Thompson, 1993), virtually all 
of the parametric tests most often used by  
researchers (e.g., ANOVA, MANOVA, multiple 
regression, Pearson correlation, t test, point-biserial 
correlation, discriminant analysis) can be subsumed 
by CCA as special cases in the GLM. This is not to 
say that CCA should always be used instead of these 
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other methods because, in many cases, this may be a 
long, tedious way to conduct an otherwise simple 
analysis.  
  
Theoretical considerations of CCA 
 
Canonical correlation analysis is used in examining 
the relationship between two sets of variables that is 
the independent set which is normally denoted as X 
and dependent set which is also denoted as Y. 
Canonical correlation analysis focuses on the 
correlation between a linear combination of the 
variables in one set (independent variable set) and the 
linear combinations of variables in another set 
(dependent set of variables). The object is then to 
find the linear combinations; 
pipii
T
i XaXaXaXaU  ...2211  (1) 
qipii
T
i YbYbYbYbV  ...2211   (2) 
such that U and V have the largest possible 
correlation. Such a linear combination can give 
insight into the relationships between the two set of 
variables. A typical way to view canonical 
correlation analysis (CCA) is as an extension of the 
traditional multiple regressions. In such case, the 
dependent set (Y-set) contains one variable instead of 
q variables and the regression solution involves the 
linear combination; XaT which in most cases is 
highly correlated with Y. While in the canonical 
correlation analysis the dependent set (Y-set) 
contains 1q  variables (that is multiple variables) 
and we look for vectors a and b for which the 
correlations between the linear combinations ( XaT
and Yb
T
i ) is maximized. With respect to this research, 
U and V are the canonical variates of governance 
mechanism and transaction attributes respectively,
1X , 2X … pX are the latent variables of observed 
variables of governance mechanisms whilst 1Y ,
2Y … pY also represents the latent variables of 
transaction attributes. The parameter estimates 
ipii aaa ..., 21 and ipii bbb ,...,, 21 are the canonical 
loadings for 1X , 2X … pX and 1Y , 2Y … pY
respectively. 
Suppose X is a 1p random vector and Y is also a 
1q random vector that is; 
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   (3) 
Suppose further that, X and Y have means X and 
Y respectively and that,  
     X
T
XX XXE  ,
     Y
T
YY YYE 
      YXXY
T
YX YXE   
Then by considering the two linear combinations 
XaU
T
i and YbV
T
i , the correlation between U 
and Vis formulated as; 
  2
1),(
 


X Y
TT
XY
T
VU
baba
ba
    (4) 
whereX , XY and Y are covariance 
matrices for X, Y and XY. 
Testing the Significance of the Canonical 
Correlation Coefficient 
In testing the significance of the canonical 
correlation coefficient, the null and the alternative 
hypothesis are respectively stated as; 
0...:
0...:
21
21


pA
po
H
H


 (5) 
In order to test the above hypothesis, the most widely 
used test statistic is the Wilk’s Lambda which is 
given by the relation; 
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)1(
1



p
i
i  (6) 
The critical value (p-value) for the test is obtained 
from F-distribution with a specific level of 
significance   . If the probability value (p-value) of 
the test is small (less than the level of significance
  ) then it indicates the rejection of the null 
hypothesis, which implies the two set of variables are 
dependent or correlated. 
6.0 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION 
6.1 Multivariate Test of Significance for 
relationship governance between the MNOs and 
content providers 
To examine the variables that influence the choice of 
mechanisms in governing the relationship between 
the MNOs and the content providers, various 
multivariate statistical techniques were used to test 
the significance of the model. The multivariate test of 
significance exhibits whether the full canonical 
model obtained is statistically significant or not by 
using various tests such as the Pillais, Hoteling, 
Wilk’s Lambda and Roys test of significance. Most 
researchers generally choose to interpret the results 
of the Multivariate test of significance on the basis of 
the Wilk’s lambda due to its high level of practicality. 
The findings or results from table7.1 below 
collectively indicates that the full canonical model 
across functions using the Wilk’s lambda (  ) 
=0.31489 criterion with F (15, 386.44) =8.11742, 
p<0.000) is statistically significant. This is result is 
additionally supported by the other tests (Pillais, 
Hoteling, and Roys test) which have their respective 
p-values being less than the 0.05 level of significance. 
Since the Wilk’s Lambda represents the variance 
unexplained by the full model, then 1-  yields the 
full canonical model effect or the amount of variance 
explained by the full canonical model. Hence for the 
full canonical model obtained, the effect size or the 
amount of variance being explained is 0.68511, 
which indicates the full canonical model explains a 
substantial portion of the variance shared between 
the variable sets (Exchange Dimensions set of 
variables and Governance Mechanism set of 
variables). 
Table 1Multivariate Test of Significance for 
relationship governance between the MNOs and 
content providers 
 
6.2 Eigen Values and Canonical Correlations for 
relationship governance between the MNOs and 
content providers 
The Eigen values and the canonical correlations on 
the other hand help in making decisions on which 
canonical function has the maximum correlation and 
also significant based on their respective shared 
variances (canonical correlation squared values). 
Table 2 below therefore gives the root number 
representing the number of canonical functions 
generated, percentages, cumulative percentages, 
canonical correlation values and the squared 
canonical correlation values of the respective 
canonical functions generated. From the table 2, it 
can be deduced from the column labelled “Root No.” 
that, three (3) canonical functions were derived from 
the canonical correlation analysis. Furthermore, 
among the three (3) canonical functions obtained 
from the analysis, the first canonical with the root 
number 1 had the largest Eigen value (0.40359), the 
highest canonical correlation value (0.82771) with a 
substantial amount of shared variance between the 
first and second set of variables used in the analysis 
(ie.68.5%). This is followed by the second canonical 
function (Root No. 2) which from the table 2 had an 
Eigen value of 0.02292, a canonical correlation value 
of 0.14970 with a shared variance of 2.24% between 
the two sets of variables. The third canonical 
function among the three canonical functions had the 
least Eigen value as well as the least canonical 
correlation value and the least shared amount of 
variance between the two sets of variables. The 
summary of this result points out that, the first 
canonical function (Root No. 1) is considered 
noteworthy and significant since it is the only root 
with the maximum correlation value and also 
explained a substantial amount of variance between 
the data sets. 
Table 2 Eigen Values and Canonical Correlations 
for relationship governance between the MNOs 
and content providers 
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6.3 Dimension Reduction Analysis for the 
governance of relationship between the MNOs 
and Content Providers 
The dimension reduction analysis on the other hand 
is employed to identify the extent to which each 
canonical function is able to account for the shared 
variance between the data sets and also allows the 
researcher to test the hierarchical arrangements of the 
functions for statistical significance. As noted from 
the result in the table3 above, it can be deduced that 
the full model (1-3) is statistically significant and 
also accounted for the largest amount of shared 
variance between the two data sets (i.e.
%5.6868511.01  ) with F (20, 1344.18) 
=8.11742. The functions 2-3 and 3-3 did not explain 
a statistically significant amount of shared variance 
between the variable sets hence insignificant with 
their respective p-values being greater than the 5 
percent level of significance. 
Table 3 Dimension Reduction Analysis for the 
relationship governance between the MNOs and 
content providers 
 
6.4 Canonical correlations for the First Canonical 
Function concerning the influence of transaction 
dimensions on choice of governance mechanisms 
with respective to the relationship between the 
MNOs and Content Providers. Given the canonical 
correlation squared value of each function, only the 
first canonical function was considered noteworthy in 
the context of the analysis since it explained a 
substantial portion of the variance. The last two 
canonical functions only explained a smaller portion 
of the variance shared between the variable set after 
the extraction of the prior function (refer table 3). 
Hence a canonical correlation analysis for only the 
first canonical function concerning the correlation 
between the two sets of variables (Transaction 
attribute set of variables and Governance Mechanism 
set of variables) is created. In order to determine the 
extent to which the variables in the two sets relate to 
each other using the first canonical function, the 
standardized or the structural coefficients (rs) of the 
respective variables are used. The results from this 
analysis indicated in the table4below include the 
evaluation of the variables using the standardized 
coefficients or the structural coefficients of the first 
canonical function and the squared structure 
coefficients representing the percentage of shared 
variance. This illustrated in the figure1 below as the 
structural model. 
Table 4: Canonical correlations for the First 
Canonical Function concerning the influence of 
transaction dimensions on choice of governance 
mechanisms with respective to the relationship 
between the MNOs and Content Providers. 
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Figure 1:  Structural Model of the governance 
mode between MNOs and content providers. 
Considering the results from Table 4 with respect the 
relationship between the transaction dimensions and 
governance mechanisms (two variable sets) using the 
first canonical function, it can be deduced that, the 
variables AUTHORITY and CONTRACT were the 
only variables that contributed significantly to or 
relevant to the dependent set (Governance 
mechanism). This is due to the fact that from the 
table 4 these variables had their respective structure 
coefficient to be greater than 45.0 and also sharing 
larger amount of variations within the set. The other 
side of the equation of the first canonical function 
from the table 4 above additionally involves the 
predictor set of variables. The results from the table 
therefore points out that only the variables 
environmental uncertainty, technological uncertainty, 
behavioural uncertainty, and frequency in the 
predictor set proofed to be relevant or significantly 
contribute to the predictor set (Transaction 
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dimensions) with a structure coefficient of -.4608, -
.5250, .6184, .5690 which were substantially greater 
than 45.0 and also share the largest amount of 
variation within the set.  
However, the  variable that did not contribute 
significantly in determining the governance 
mechanisms was ASSET SPECIFICITY with  
structure  coefficient of (.1269) which is woefully 
lower than the thresh hold of 45.0
.
 
DISCUSSIONS  
The results from both the dependent set and the 
independent set with respect to the first canonical 
function gives the indication that in a relationship 
between MNOs and Content providers the prediction 
that asset specificity positively influence the 
preference of authority-base governance was not 
supported, since it is insignificant or proofed to be 
irrelevant in this relationship to choose authority base 
governance mechanism.  
The structure coefficient of (.1269) which is woefully 
lower than the thresh hold of 45.0
. The plausible 
explanation could be that the specificity of assets was 
low. 
Therefore, we could not tell the superior 
predictive ability for asset specificity since it 
appeared to be irrelevant in this relationship. Thus, 
Williamson’s assertion that asset specificity is the 
engine or driver of governance choice was not 
evidenced. 
Empirical results did not support the prediction that 
environmental uncertainty positively influences the 
preference for authority-base governance 
mechanisms. The structural coefficient (-.4608) was 
significant but negative, indicating that 
environmental uncertainty proofed to be relevant in 
this relationship but decreases when preference for 
authority base governance mechanism increases, 
suggesting that the mobile network operators do not 
prefer the use of authority-base governance 
mechanisms when environmental uncertainty exist. 
However, environmental uncertainty was rather 
positively related to the preference for contract–base 
governance mechanisms, showing that as 
environmental uncertainty increases the preference 
for contract-base governance increases. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Folta (1998)that firms 
decision makers prefer to govern transaction 
uncertainties with less integrated modes of 
governance, and also corroborates with  the findings 
that firms that are into alliances are likely to be 
governed by contractual agreement under high 
environmental uncertainty (Osborn & Baughn, 1990). 
Also the prediction that behavioural uncertainty 
positively influences the preference for authority-
base governance mechanisms was supported. The 
empirical results show that the structural coefficient 
(.6184) of the variable behavioural uncertainty is 
significant and positive. This indicates that as 
behavioural uncertainty increases the preference for 
authority-base governance mechanisms in the 
relationship increases. The possible explanation is 
that the presence of performance measurement 
difficulty under an imbalance of power might give 
rise to the preference for authority-base governance 
mechanisms .This result is supported with Meta-
analysis findings of Geyskens, Steenkamp, and 
Kumar (2006) of behavioural uncertainty promoting 
the choice of hierarchical governance mechanisms. 
Also, the findings that behavioural uncertainty 
positively relates to high degree of integration 
(Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984) lends support to our 
empirical results. The results is also consistent with 
the contention of Williamson (1985). However, the 
results showed that behavioural uncertainty is 
negatively influencing the preference of contract-
base governance mechanism.  
Further, the empirical results showed that, the 
structural coefficient of technological uncertainty (-
.5250) is significant but negatively related to the 
preference for authority-base governance 
mechanisms. This indicates that, in the relationship 
between the mobile network operators and the 
content providers, as technological uncertainty 
increases the preference for authority-base 
governance decreases. Thus the result supports the 
predicted hypothesis that technological uncertainty 
negatively influences the choice of authority-base 
governance mechanism. The plausible explanation is 
that customers have become so sophisticated to the 
extent that the demand for better services keeps 
changing, and that if activities are performed 
internally they might not be able to meet customers 
increasing demand for better services. The empirical 
result corroborates with the findings that in the face 
of technological uncertainty, market governance are 
preferred over hierarchical governance (Balakrishnan 
& Wernerfelt, 1986; Geyskens et al., 2006; Schilling 
& Steensma, 2002). 
Finally, the prediction of hypothesis 5 that high level 
frequency of transaction positively influence the 
preference the for authority-base governance 
mechanism is supported. The empirical result 
showed that, the structural coefficient ( .5690) of 
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frequency is significant and positive, indicating that 
in a relationship between the mobile network 
operator and content provider, the more transaction 
recur the more the preference for authority-base 
governance mechanisms. But negatively influence 
the preference for contract-base governance 
mechanisms. The possible explanation given was that, 
recurring transaction between partners give rise to a 
better appreciation and understanding of the 
objective of transaction, thereby making the 
preference for authority governance mechanism 
suitable. This result corroborates with the findings 
that an increased frequency of transaction will reduce 
the information asymmetry between the 
organizations making hierarchical mechanisms more 
appropriate (Van de Vrande et al., 2006; Van de 
Vrande et al., 2009), Again, it is as well consistent 
with the findings of Masters and Miles (2002), when 
they noted that hierarchical governance mechanisms 
have the ability to bring down transaction costs by 
enhancing ongoing negotiating and renegotiating 
costs with other transactors ,when the source of the 
costs is associated with repeated negotiations of  
contracts for recurring needs .Thus, our results 
support the position of Williamson that, recurring 
transactions increases the preference for hierarchical 
governance since it has the ability to recover 
overhead cost more easily. 
 
7. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Our estimated canonical correlation analysis model, 
with five predictor variables used to measure the 
extent of influence on the choice of authority-base 
governance, two of the predictor variables, 
behavioural uncertainty and recurring transaction 
proofed to be relevant in the relationship and 
corroborate with the reasoning of transaction cost 
theory , that an increase in behavioural uncertainty or 
transaction frequency give rise to an increase in the 
preference of authority-base governance mechanisms. 
The empirical results regarding the predictor 
variables of environmental uncertainty and 
technological uncertainty were contrary to the logic 
of transaction cost theory. Williamson posits that, 
when environmental uncertainty increases, contracts 
are more incomplete and thereby causing adaptation 
problems, and subsequently a rise in the number of 
unforeseen contingencies. However, because these 
contingencies are unforeseen, transactors cannot 
specify them in contracts, which increase the threat 
of opportunism when adaptations are needed, and 
therefore give rise for preference of more integrated 
governance mode. However, our results indicate that 
in the relationship between the mobile network 
operators and content providers, in the presence of 
environmental uncertainty a less integrated form of 
governance is preferred. Asset specificity the 
‘locomotive’ dimension of the transaction cost theory 
as described by Williamson was though positively 
related to the choice of authority-base governance 
mechanisms, but however, it proofed not to be 
relevant in the relationship due to its low structural 
coefficient of (.1269) making it to have less influence. 
The plausible explanation is that asset specificity was 
not categorised into types as proposed by transaction 
cost theory. It was used as a mono dimensional 
variable. Perhaps if we had categorised it into 
physical asset, site assets, human assets, dedicated 
assets, brand name capital assets, and temporary 
assets, the results would have been different to 
corroborate with the position of transaction cost 
theory, since the relevant investments would have 
been substantially present. In the relationship 
between the mobile network operators and content 
providers, among the six dimensions of asset 
specificity, only human and dedicated asset 
specificities were minimally present. The mobile 
network operators’ make heavy investments to enrich 
the content of their mobile network, in order to serve 
their large customer base well.  
 
8. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Scholars rarely give theoretical accounts on studies 
around small platform owners like the mobile 
network operators and their relationship with other 
actors in the mobile telecommunication network. We 
believe further research in this domain will reveal 
interesting findings to enrich or develop new theories 
relating to relationship governance. 
The inability of our findings to corroborate with the 
logic of transaction cost theory on asset specificity 
relating positively with authority governance could 
stem from the way we treated asset specificity in our 
study. The study treated asset specificity as a mono-
dimensional measure of transaction cost theory, we 
believe if asset specificity is treated as multi-
dimensional measure of transaction cost theory, 
interesting findings could be realised. We therefore 
suggest further studies in this regards. 
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